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RAPE SHIELD LAWS: PROTECTING THE
VICTIM AT THE EXPENSE OF THE
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
I. Introduction
Rape is a crime differentfrom any other,' in part because of the
elements of the crime,2 but mostly because of the historical treatment of
the crime and its victims.' Traditionally, a crime is defined by
examining what the defendant did and what the intended consequences
of the crime were.' Rape is different from this standard definition
because courts have almost always focused on the victim and only
Susan Estrich, Rape,, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1093 (1986) (stating that there is no
"model statute" solution where rape law is involved because the problem is with our
interpretationor our understandingof words in the statute such as "consent" and "will" and
"force"); see also Sakthi Murthy, Rejecting Unreasonable Sexual Expectations: Limits on
Using a Rape Victim's Sexual History to Show the Defendant's Mistaken Belief in Consent,
79 CAL. L. REv. 541, 545 (1991) (stating that people would never consent to assault or
murder whereas sex can be consensual).
2See Clifford S. Fishman, Consent, Credibility, and the Constitution: Evidence
Relating to a Sex Offense Complainant's Past Sexual Behavior, 44 CATH. U. L. REv. 709,
713-14 (1995) (stating the elements of most sexual offense crimes are: "(1) the defendant
engaged in a statutorily designated sexual activity with the complainant, (2) without her
consent, and (3) against her will," and noting that some states still require proof of the use
of force by the defendant).
Estrich, supra note 1, at 1093 (stating that the only way to determine whether
there was consent is to examine the victim's response to the situation); see also Catherine L.
Kello, Rape ShieldLegislation-Is It Time for Reinforcement?, 21 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 317,
319 (1988) (noting that prior to the adoption of Michigan's rape shield law the judiciary
considered rape a sex crime rather than a crime of violence, thereby requiring the victim to
prove the attack was against her will and defense attorneys would harass victims by
questioning them about their prior sexual activity, thus putting the victim, rather than the
defendant, on trial).
Estrich, supra note 1, at 1094.
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incidentally on the defendant.5 In addition, the issue of a victim's
consent is always a key component in a rape prosecution, whereas in
other criminal prosecutions it is not a critical issue.'
For the past two decades, almost all fifty states and the federal
government have adopted rape shield laws7 in order to protect the victim
of a rape from having to disclose her past sexual conduct when testifying
against her alleged attacker!
This Note Will first look at the origin of rape shield legislation
and why the need for reform arose. Next, the Note will look at each of
the four categories or varieties of rape shield statutes and how they differ
from each other. Third, this Note will conduct a case-by-case analysis
of how the courts have interpreted the rape shield statute of their
jurisdiction and how these interpretationshave infringed on defendants'
constitutional rights because of an abuse ofjudicial discretion and a lack
of legislative guidance, especially in cases where consent is the defense.
Fourth, this Note will show that when judges do not receive proper
guidance from the legislature, victims are not properly protected.
Finally, this Note will argue that, because of the varied state court
interpretations of rape shield laws, it is now necessary for the United
States Supreme Court to address these issues.
Id. at 1094.
6Id. at 1126. For example, the issue of consent is not a focus in robbery cases
where there would normally be no "claims that the victim cooperated with the taking of
money." Id.
' Michael Phillips, Utah Rape Rate Among Highest in the Nation, Utah Among
Worst in Rape Rates, State Experts Point to Population, Puritanism, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr.
28, 1993, at AI (noting that only Arizona and Utah have not enacted rape shield statutes).
But see State ex rel Pope v. Super. Ct. of Ariz., 545 P.2d 946 (Ariz. 1976) (holding that
evidence of a victim's chastity is not admissible in most circumstances, thereby enforcing the
state rape shield law through the common law); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980)
(creating a common law rape shield law by holding that evidence of a victim's past sexual
activity is irrelevant to the issue of consent).
' Kello, supra note 3, at 319-21 (analyzing the legislative history of the nation's
first rape shield statute).
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II. The History of Rape Shield Statutes
A. Common Law
At common law, evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior was
always relevant and admissible into evidence in rape prosecutions? This
is because a victim's past sexual conduct could prove a history of
unchaste behavior.' ° Unchaste behavior also was thought to purport
dishonesty." This allowed allegations of promiscuity to be entered into
evidence not only to show consent, but also to attack a victim's
credibility.12
As society changed, attitudes towards sexual behavior became
more relaxed.'3 These relaxed views negated the traditional belief that
a promiscuous victim will always consent to sex. 4 This change of
philosophy paved the way for the introduction of rape shield legislation
to protect a victim of a rape from being traumatized by an attorney when
she testified at trial against her attacker. 5
Pamela J. Fisher, State v. Alvey: Iowa's Victimization of Defendants Through
the Overextensionoflowa's Rape ShieldLaw, 76 IOWA L. REv. 835, 837-38 (1991) (stating
that at common law a victim's lack of chastity could lead the jury to infer an assent to the
alleged rape); see also Murthy, supra note I, at 541 (stating that prior to jurisdictions
enacting rape shield laws, evidence of a victim's past sexual practices was considered
relevant).
" "Chastity can be defined as a woman's abstention from premarital or extramarital
sexual intercourse." Fisher, supra note 9, at 837 n.17.
"Id. at 838.
12 See Fishman, supra note 2, at 715 (stating it was believed that a woman's lack
of chastity was relevant to prove that she was a liar).
'" Fisher, supra note 9, at 839 (noting that attitudes towards non-marital sexual
relations have relaxed because there is no longer 'the traditional belief that a promiscuous
victim always consents to sex").
"4 Id. (explainingthat these relaxed attitudes led legislaturesto review the common
law rule).
"s David Haxton, Rape Shield Statutes: Constitutional Despite Unconstitutional
Exclusions of Evidence, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1219, 1220 (1985) (stating that rape shield
statutes are intended to limit harassing defense questions and to encourage victims to report
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B. Adopting Rape Shield Legislation
In the mid- 1970's, Congress and state legislatures began passing
statutes that protected the victim of a rape from victimization when
testifying against her 6 attacker. 17 The first rape shield statute was
passed in Michigan in 1974 and by 1976 over half of the states had
enacted some form of a rape shield statute.'
the crimes).
6 To avoid confusion, this Note will depict the victim as a female and the male as
the defendant. This in no way minimizes the reality of male rape. However, male rape is
beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of the subject of male rape, see generally
Nicholas Groth & Ann Burgess, Male Rape: Offenders and Victims, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
806 (1980).
17 HarriettR. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A
Proposalfor the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 764-65 (1986).
"s See FED. R. EVID. 412 (West 1996); ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (1995); ALASKA
STAT. § 12.45.045(Michie 1990);ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-42-101 (Michie 1993); CAL. EVID.
CODE § 782, 1103 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407 (West 1986); CONN; GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54- 86F (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. §§ 3508-3509 (1995); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 794.022(2)-(3) (West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3 (Michie 1995); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 626-1,RULE412(Michie 1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-6105 (1987); ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 725:5/1 15-7(West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (West 1994); IOWA R. EVID.
412 (West 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3525 (1994); KY. R. EVID. 412 (1992); LA: CODE
EVID. ANN. art. 412,412.1 (West 1995); ME. R. EvID. 412 (1995); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 461A(1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, 21B (West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§750.520j (West 1991);MINN. R. EVID. 412 (1990);MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-68(1996); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 491.015 (West 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(2)(1993);NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 28-321 (Michie 1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.069, 50.090 (Michie
1993); N.H. R. EVID. 412 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.1 (West 1994); N.M. R.
EVID. 11-413 (Michie 1996); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1992); N.C. R.
EVID. 412 (1996);N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-14(1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02
(D) (Anderson 1994); OKLA..STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 2412 (West 1995); OR. EVID. CODE 412
(1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11 -37-13(1994);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Law. Co-op. 1985);.S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-22-15
(Michie 1995); TENN. R. EVID. 412 (1996);TEX. R. CRIM. EViD. 412(1996): VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 3255 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (Michie 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.020(West 1988); W. VA. CODE § 61- 8B-I 1(1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 971.31 (11),
972.11 (2),(West 1994); WYO. STAT. § 6-2-312 (Michie 1988).
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The need for reform arose' 9 because countless victims, already
traumatized by the rape, refused to report the crime or to testify out of
fear that the proceedings would become an inquisition into her sexual
past, thereby requiring victims to justify their behavior.2" The pressure
for' reform came from an alliance of feminist organizations and law
enforcement agencies.21
The most important issue in the debate over rape legislation
reform was whether a women's unchaste behavior had any probative
value to the question of whether she was raped.22 To date, nearly all
jurisdictions have a rape shield statute23 which falls into one of four
categories?4 Although the four "model" approaches differ, their "single
common feature is a rejection of the previous automatic admissibility of
proof of unchastity.' The four approaches have been referred to as the
Michigan, New Jersey, Federal and California approaches. 26
'9 Haxton, supra note 15, at 1220.
21 People v. Arenda, 330 N.W. 2d 814, 816 (Mich. 1982).
21 Galvin, supra note 17, at 767 (citing C. Wright & K. Graham, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5382); see also Lara English Simmons, Michigan v. Lucas:
Failing to Define the State Interest in Rape Shield Legislation, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1592, 1601
(1992).
22 Galvin, supra note 17, at 767-68 (stating that the women's movement not only
targeted the evidentiary problems of rape prosecutions but also attacked all stereotypical
views and attitudes towards women).
23 See Simmons, supra note 2 1, at 1592; see also Haxton, supra note 15, at 1219;
Fisher, supra note 9, at 840.
24 Galvin, supra note 17, at 773. For a discussion of the four categories see infra
Part I1.
25 Id
26 Id. Professor Galvin first used this four model approach in her 1986 article
analyzing rape shield statutes. Id. Other commentators have chosen different ways to
categorize these statutes. See Andrew Z. Soshnick, Comment, The Rape Shield Paradox:
Complainant Protection Amidst Oscillating Trends of State Judicial Interpretation, 78 J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 644 (1987)(focusing on the rape shield laws of five states which
the author argues is representativeof the various statutes). For purposes of this Note, I will
use Professor Galvin's classificationbecause I believe they are the clearest. However, in the
time since Professor Galvin published her article, Texas has amended its rape shield statute.
Therefore, the model that Professor Galvin regarded as the Texas model will now be referred
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III. The Four Approaches
A. The Michigan Approach27
The Michigan Rape Shield Statute is the most restrictive and the
most prevalent of the rape shield laws.2" Under this approach, judges
have the least discretion in determining which evidence of a victim's
past sexual history will be considered relevant.29 The Michigan
legislature has predetermined through its statute which evidence will be
admissible.3" The statute prohibits all evidence of the victim's past
sexual conduct unless the trial judge finds it is evidence of: (1) the
victim's past sexual conduct with the actor, or (2) specific instances or
origin of semen, pregnancy or disease.3 Evidence of the victim's sexual
conduct with third parties is admissible only if the defendant uses this
evidence to show he was not the source of the semen found in the
victim.3 2 As a result of these rigid requirements, appellate courts have
"strained to uphold the validity of these statutes, while at the same time
to as the New Jersey model.
27 Twenty-twojurisdictions follow the Michigan approach. These states include:
Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. See
generally Galvin, supra note 17.
28 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 1991). See Galvin, supra note 17,
at 773 (noting that the states following the Michigan approach have virtually stripped the
court's power to determine relevance of evidence pertaining to a complainant's past sexual
history on a case-by-casebasis); see also Haxton, supra note 15, at 1225-26 (stating that the
reason behind this restrictive statute was the legislature's distrust of the judiciary).
29 See Linda Robayo, The Glen Ridge Trial: New Jersey's Cue to Amend its Rape
ShieldStatute, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 272, 297 n. 161(1994) (stating that the goal of these
statutes is to eliminate any evidence that does not specifically comport with the two
exceptions set out in the statutes).
30 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 1991).
"' See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (l)(a) and (1)(b) (West 1991).
32 Id.
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ordering the introduction of relevant sexual conduct evidence.
33
Although the statutes go a long way in attempting to protect a rape
victim, they also deny, in many cases, a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to confront all witnesses against him.34 If a court does not wish to
circumvent the statute through its discretionary powers, it will, find the
statute unconstitutional as applied to a particular factual setting, thus
allowing such evidence.35
Considering that roughly half of the jurisdictions in this country
have enacted some variant under the Michigan model, it is important to
examine some of the added exceptions that certain states have adopted
to try to reduce the rigidity of the prohibition of admitting evidence of
a victim's past sexual conduct. 36 All states following this model allow
evidence of prior sexual conduct between the defendant and the victim?
7
Twenty-two jurisdictions allow a defendant to introduce
evidence of sexual conduct between the victim and other individuals to
prove that the source of semen or other physical injury was not the
defendant?8 In states that do not allow any evidence of sexual conduct,
13 Galvin, supra note 17, at 773. For a discussion of cases applying the Michigan
approach and analysis of how the judiciary has circumventedthe statutes see infra Part IV.B.
34 U.S. CONST. amend VI. But see Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149 (1991)
(holding that the Sixth Amendment's "right to present relevant testimony is not without
limitation," and that a defendant has no right to introduce irrelevant evidence).
" Galvin, supra note 17, at 773-74 (concluding that it is virtually impossible for
the legislature to anticipate the "myriad" of facts that may arise in which evidence of past
sexual conduct is relevant).36 See id. at 816-71 (discussingthe different exceptions present in states following
the Michigan approach and cases relevant to such exceptions).
37 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022 (2)-(3)(West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-
2-3 (Michie 1995).
38 Thesejurisdictionsinclude: the U.S. Government, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii,
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia
and Wisconsin. See Galvin, supra note 17, at 818-19 (stating that this evidence is only
relevant where the defendant denies engaging in the sexual act in question). These
jurisdictions do not all necessarily follow the Michigan approach, as the Federal approach
also has specific exceptions to admissibility. See infra Part III.C.
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except between the defendant and victim, courts take it upon themselves
to admit evidence when the defendant claims he is not the source of the
semen, therefore, the courts circumvent the legislature through their own
rulings 9 However, it is necessary for courts to have such discretionary
power; otherwise defendants would not be given due process and the
statute would not pass constitutional muster.40
Other exceptions that exist in various states include: the
admissibilityof evidence showing a pattern of behaviortending to prove
the alleged victim consented,4' evidence of past false accusations of
rape, 42 and evidence of conduct to rebut the state's proof.43 These
examples are just a few of the variations of exceptions found in state
statutes which follow the Michigan model."
For a court to determine whether evidence is admissible under
any of the enumerated exceptions, it is almost always necessary to first
review the sexual conduct evidence, and to weigh its probative value
39See, e.g., Shockley v. State, 585 S.W.2d 645, 649-50 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978)
(approving the trial court's admittance of evidence that the victim was pregnant to prove that
she had intercourse during the relevant time period in spite of the fact that there were no
Tennessee cases that directly addressed this issue. However, the appellate court held that the
trial court erred when the defendant was prevented from introducing evidence that he was
not the man who impregnated her. The appellate court stated the purpose of the statute was
to prevent the defendant from besmirching the victim's reputation, but since the defendant
was not doing this, the statute was not controlling).
"o State v. Howard, 426 A.2d 457, 462 (N.H. 1981) (holding that a trial court,
"while remaining mindful of the important policy considerations underlying the rape shield
statute," must, upon motion, afford the defendant the opportunity to give an in camera offer
of proof of why otherwise inadmissibleevidence should be allowed. After such hearing, the
trial court, in its discretion, may permit such evidence in the interest of protecting the
defendant's rights to due process, and to confront the witness who accuses him).
41 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022 (2)-(3) (West 1995).
42 See, e.g.,Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 971.31 (11), 972.11 (2) (West 1994).43 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. art.27, § 461 A (1992). But see Galvin, supra note 17,
at 854 (stating that evidence of this type raises the question of whether the prosecution
should be allowed to introduce evidence of a victim's past sexual conduct at all).
41 See Galvin, supra note 17, at 819-71 (discussing all the other exceptions).
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against its prejudicial value.45  However, even if a court finds the
probative value is greater than its prejudicial effect, according to all
statutes following the Michigan model, a court is not allowed to
introduce such evidence unless the statute specifically provides an
exception for admission.46 This is the commonality among all
Michigan-type statutes. Regardless of the number of exceptions the
statute contains, the trial court must follow these exceptions without
using its discretion to allow the admission of any unexcepted evidence 
7
Although a court may find the proffered evidence relevant given the
circumstancesof the case, when courts allow unexcepted evidence to be
presented at trial they are going beyond their authority.48 This is the
flaw in the Michigan model.
49
B. The New Jersey Approach5"
The New Jersey approach has the opposite problem.5 In states
4. Id. at 872.
46 Id.
471 d. at 873.
48 See infra Part IV.B.
" See Galvin, supra note 17, at 873 (stating that instead of finding the statutes
unconstitutional,courts will admit this evidence on a case-by-case basis, thus undermining
the legislative intent); see also J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim
Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544, 560 (1980).
So The jurisdictions that follow the New Jersey approach include: Alaska,
Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Dakota and Wyoming. See
generally Galvin, supra note 17. As mentioned above, this is the category Professor Galvin
referred to as the Texas approach, howeverTexas has since amended its statute and is listed
under the Federal approach. See TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 412 (1996). When this Note refers to
the New Jersey approach it is synonymousto what Professor Galvin would have labeled the
Texas approach.
. Galvin, supra note 17, at 774 (referring to the New Jersey approach as having
the opposite defect. as the Michigan approach); see also Robayo, supra note 29, at 302 n. 191
(stating that judges in jurisdictions that follow the New Jersey approach have the freedom
to determine what is admissible).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs.
following this model, the trial judge has complete discretion on the issue
of whether to admit evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct.52 The
discretion the trial judge uses is the traditional balancing test of whether
the evidence's probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. 3 If the
probative value prevails, the evidence is admissible." This approach
does not suffer the same constitutional attacks as does the Michigan
approach because discretion is given solely to the trial judge on a case-
by-case basis." Under the New Jersey-type statute, if a defendant
wishes to introduce evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior, he must
inform the court, and the relevance of the evidence will be reviewed
through an in camera hearing, after which time the trial judge will frame
the limits of the questions that will be allowed.56 If the judge rules that
certain questions are inappropriate, these inquiries may not be raised
during the trial and the victim will be spared the humiliation of public
disclosure of her sex life. 7 This amount of judicial discretion, without
any guidelines on what evidence is relevant, does not serve the
intentions of rape shield legislation-it does not protect the victim any
more than she would have been prior to the passing of rape shield
legislation.5
52 Robayo, supra note 29, at 302.
53 See FED. R. EVID. 403 (West 1996).
54 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84-32.1 (West 1994).
" Robayo, supra note 29, at 302.56 SeeN.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84-32.1 (West 1994).
" Galvin, supra note 17, at 883 (stating that the dangers of giving the trial court
such unfettered discretion always leaves open the possibility that this discretion will be
abused).
58 Robayo, supra note 29, at 302 (stating that the victim's protection from an
intrusion into her sex life under the New Jersey statute is solely at the discretion of the trial
judge).
494 [Vol. XIII
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C. The Federal Approach59
The Federal approach is a hybrid of both the under-inclusive
Michigan model and the over-inclusive New Jersey model. 60 The three
features of this. approach are: (1) a general prohibition of any evidence
regarding a victim's past sexual conduct; (2) several exceptions allowing
evidence considered relevant;6' and (3) a "catch-all" provision
authorizing the trial court to review any sexual behavior evidence for
which there is no exception. 62  The states that follow the Federal
approach vary slightly regarding the evidence for which they provide
exceptions. 63 The "catch-all" provision excludes from the statute all
evidence that is "constitutionally required to be omitted" or "relevant
and admissible in the interest ofjustice.' *4 The "catch-all" provision can
potentially undermine the rest of the statute by allowing evidence of a
9 The jurisdictions following the Federal approach are: Connecticut, Hawaii,
Illinois, Iowa, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas and the U.S. military.
See generally Galvin, supra note 17.
6' See generally Galvin, supra note 17, at 883.
6! FED. R. EVID. 412 (b)(l)(A) and (b)(1)(B) reads:
(1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible
... (A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by
the alleged victim offered to prove that a person other than
the accused was the source of semen, injury or other physical
evidence; (B) evidence of specific instances of sexual
behavior by the alleged victim with respect to the person
accused of the sexual misconduct offered by the accused to
prove consent ....
FRE 412 was amended in 1995. Fishman, supra note 2, at 719. The new version
differs from its predecessor primarily in style. Id. The basic changes are that the rules now
extend to civil cases and, also, the balancing test used by the judge to determine probative
value was altered. Id.
62 Galvin, supra note 17, at 883.
63 Id. at 885.
6 4 FED. R. EVID. 412 (b)(I)(C) (West 1996).
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victim's past sexual conduct due to judicial bias.65 Essentially, the
"catch-all" provision of the statute gives judges as much discretion in
admitting evidence as would a judge in a jurisdiction following the New
Jersey approach.66 For these reasons, although the language of the
Federal rape shield statute appears to provide the victim with greater
protection, the "catch-all" provision virtually eliminates the other
provisions in the statute.
D. The California Approach67
The final approach to rape shield laws is the California approach.
The uniqueness of this approach is that it divides past sexual history into
two categories: 1) evidence that goes toward proving the defense of
consent and, 2) evidence offered to attack the credibility of the accuser.68
The California statute generally does not allow evidence of past sexual
behavior evidence offered for the issue of consent, however, this
evidence may be admitted to attack a victim's credibility.69
Critics of the California-style law argue that the statute is
basically ineffective if a trial court rules the proffered evidence attacks
65 Robayo, supra note 29, at 299 (stating thai this exception poses a great risk
because Congress never defined what evidence should constitutionally be permitted); see
also Galvin, supra note 17, at 886-87.
66 See Galvin, supra note 17, at 887.
67 The jurisdictions that follow the California approach include: Delaware,
Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma and Washington. See generally Galvin,
supra note 17.
6' Galvin, supra note 17, at 775 (stating that the first category of evidence is
substantiveevidence and the other category is credibility evidence); see also Haxton, supra
note 15, at 1226.
69 See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103 (West 1995); see also Robayo, supra note
29, at 301-02 (stating that the defendant simply has to change the purpose for which he is
using the evidence to make it admissible under the credibility section, where it would not
have been admissible if used to show consent).
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credibility rather than proves consent.7 ° The statute does not do a
sufficientjob of distinguishing between the evidence that proves consent
and that which proves credibility. 7' In essence, evidence that attacks
credibility-and evidence that proves consent are actually "functional
equivalents. ,
72
The fact that evidence tending to prove consent is essentially the
same as that offered to attack credibility is apparent from the statutes
following the California model. Some of these jurisdictions, although
still following the California approach of separating evidence into
consent and credibility, allow evidence which may prove consent while
excluding evidence that would attack a victim's credibility. 73 Again, in
order to make these: statutes effective, legislatures following the
California approach must amend their statutes to define evidence which
they are willing to accept as that which tends to prove consent and that
which tends to prove credibility. Otherwise, defendants can continue to
claim that the evidence of the victim's past Sexual history falls in the
category for which their state has an exception.
IV. Challenges To Rape Shield Statutes
Rape shield statutes have been consistently upheld by the courts
despite numerous claims that they violate a defendant's due process or
equal protection rights and that they deny a defendant the right to cross-
70 Robayo, supra note 29, at 301 n.185.
7' Galvin, supra note 17, at 894-95 (stating further that allowing evidence which
attacks a victim's credibility apparently resurrects the common law notion allowing evidence
of unchastityto prove a lack of credibility). Ironically, California was not one of the states
at common law that adopted the notion that "promiscuity imports dishonesty" and that the
drafters of the statute probably did not intend to change their common law rule. Id. at 895.
72 Id. at 775 (stating that "[e]vidence that establishes consent by the complainant
will simultaneously impeach her credibility, and evidence that impeaches her credibility will
raise the likelihood of consent").
.3 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020 (West 1988); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 48.069, 50.090 (Michie 1993).
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examine and confront his accusers.74 No rape shield statute has been
found unconstitutionalon its face, although there have been cases where
courts have held that the statute as applied to the particular facts of a
case was unconstitutional." When a legislature predetermines that a
category of evidence is irrelevant and prejudicial, it may prevent a
defendant from cross-examining a complainant on relevant evidence.76
Judicial protection of rape victims through broad interpretations of the
state rape shield laws unfairly victimizes the defendant by denying him
his constitutional rights.77
A. Supreme Court Decisions on Rape Shield Laws
On two occasions, challenges to rape shield laws have been
heard by the United States Supreme Court.78 In Michigan v. Lucas,79 the
defendant did not give the required notice of his intent to introduce
evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual relations with him.8 ° The
trial court ruled this evidence was inadmissible.8' The Michigan Court
of Appeals reversed the decision and adopted a per se rule that
"preclusion of evidence of a rape victim's prior sexual relationship with
a criminal defendant violates the Sixth Amendment." 2 The United
"4 Fishman, supra note 2, at 722.
7' For a discussion of cases challenging rape shield statutes see infra Part IV. But
see State v. Herndon, 426 N.W.2d 347 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that if a statute were to
absolutely prohibit evidence of a complainant's past sexual history it would violate a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights).
76 Simmons, supra note 21, at 1594.
17 See Fisher, supra note 9, at 835 (explaining this victimization occurs when a
court bars impeachment evidence under the state's rape shield statute).
71 Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988); Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145
(1991).
79 500 U.S. 145 (1991).
80 Id.
81 Id.
2 Lucas, 500 U.S. at 146.
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States Supreme Court reversed,83 holding that the notice and hearing
requirement of the statute84 served a legitimate state interest and failure
to comply justified preclusion. However, the Court concluded that a per
se rule declaring the notice and hearing requirement unconstitutional
was error.85 Thus, the rape shield statute in issue was held constitutional.
The other Supreme Court decision came in Olden v. Kentucky.86
In Olden, the defendant, an African-Americanmale, wished to introduce
evidence to show the alleged victim consented to intercourse and had a
motive to fabricate the charges. 7 The trial court did not allow this
evidence believing it would be too prejudicial.88 The Supreme Court
found that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding testimony
which showed a motive to lie 9 and reversed the decision of the lower
court and the Kentucky Court of Appeals.9" This decision is consistent
with the Michigan approach because if the evidence is not specifically
83 id.
14 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 1991) (requiring that the
defendant file written notice if he wishes to introduce evidence of a victim's past sexual
conduct within ten days after arraignment).
85 Lucas, 500 U.S. at 153. On remand, the Michigan Court of Appeals held it was
necessary to determine whether the exclusion of evidence was proper, and if the trial court
concluded the excluded evidence was necessary, a new trial should be granted. Michigan
v. Lucas, 484 N.W. 2d 685 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
86 488 U.S. 227 (1988). Kentucky's rape shield law follows the Michigan
approach. See supra note 27.
87 Olden, 488 U.S. at 228. Specifically, the defendant wanted to introduce
evidence that the victim and a man, Russel, who testified at trial to partially corroborate the
victim's story that she got out of a car after being raped, were lovers and the reason she
fabricated the story was to keep Russel from finding out she had cheated on him. Id Russel
was a black male and the trial court excluded this evidence because showing that the victim
was co-habitating with a black man would be highly prejudicial. Id. at 230.
88 Id. at 227.
89 The trial court did not prohibit the proffered evidence due to its sexual nature
but rather because of potential biracial prejudice. Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court's
holding was not truly based on the rape shield law. See Fishman, supra note 2, at 753
(stating that the result no doubt would have been the same had the Court ruled on the sexual
nature of the evidence).
9 Olden, 488 U.S. at 233.
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precluded by the rape shield statute, it should be admitted, thus
supporting the legislative intent to take power away from the judiciary?'
B. Challenges to the Michigan Approach
at the State Court Level
The Michigan Supreme Court has consistently upheld the
constitutional ityof their state's rape shield law.92 Michigan's statute, like
the twenty-five states that followit, is the most restrictive of all the rape
shield statutes.93 Therefore, although the statute has been ruled
constitutional-on its face, there may be instances where the facts of a
particular case make the law unconstitutional as applied because it
infringes upon a defendant's rights.94
In People v. Arenda,95 the Michigan Supreme Court stated "the
right of cross-examination is more than a desirable rule of trial
procedure. It is implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation and
helps assure the 'accuracy of truth determining process.""e6 However, the
Court went on to state that "the right to confront and cross-examine is
not without limits, It does not include a right to cross-examine on
irrelevant issues. It may bow to accommodate other legitimate interests
9' See infra Part IV.B. discussing the intent behind the Michigan approach.
" See People v. Arenda, 330 N.W.2d 814 (Mich. 1982); People v. Williams, 330
N.W.2d 823 (Mich. 1982).
9' See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West, 1991).
14 See People v. Hackett, 365 N.W.2d 120, 124 (Mich. 1985) (explaining that in
certain limited situations, evidence of a rape complainant's prior sexual conduct may be
relevant and its admission may be required to preserve a defendant's constitutional right to
confrontation).
" 330N.W. 2d 814 (Mich. 1982). The defendant was convicted on three counts
of criminal sexual conduct involving an eight-year-oldmale victim. He wished to introduce
evidence that the victim had past sexual relations with others in order to explain his ability
to accurately depict the sexual acts that allegedly occurred. Id. at 815.
96 Id. at 815 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)).
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in the criminal trial process. 97
In Court ruled that the statute was facially valid and therefore
reinstated the defendant's conviction.98 The Arenda Court found that
evidence of a victim's past sexual conduct is of minimal relevance in
most cases, and therefore found the defendant's right of confrontation
should not be violated.9 Although ruling the statute was constitutionally
valid on its face, the Court left open the idea that certain facts, in
operation with the statute, could violate a defendant's rights. The Court
stated "if such: a set of facts arises as.to place in question the
constitutional application of the rape shield law, it can be addressed."' 00
In People v. Hackett,1°' the Court explained its decision in
Arenda: "[b]y enacting a general exclusionary rule, the Legislature
recognized that in the vast majority of cases, evidence of a rape victim's
prior sexual conduct with others, and sexual reputation, when offered to
prove that the conduct at issue was consensual or for general
impeachment, is inadmissible.' '02 In both these scenarios, a victim's past
sexual conduct is inadmissible." 3
The courts of other states which- follow the Michigan approach
have also ruled on the constitutionality of rape shield statutes, in
operation. The Ohio Supreme Court, in a trilogy of cases, determined
the constitutionality of Ohio's rape shield law. In State v. Williams,1
04
97 Id. at 816.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 817.
'
00 Arenda, 330 N.W.2d at 818.
01 365 N.W.2d 120 (Mich. 1975).
102 Hackett, 365 N.W.2d at 124 (stating that the reason for prohibiting evidence
tending to prove consent is because it is circumstantial, evidence of conduct, and that
evidence of prior sexual conduct is a collateral matter bearing on credibility which may be
denied).
13 For example, the Court stated this evidence might be relevant to show prior
false accusations or motive for the victim to lie. Id. at 124-25.
104 487 N.E.2d 560 (Ohio 1986). In Williams, the defendant wished to introduce
evidence that the victim was a prostitute and that he was her pimp in order to prove she
fabricated the rape charge to get even with him for stealing money from her. Id. The Ohio
N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM. RTS.
the Court employed a balancing test to determine whether their state
statute was constitutional.' °5 The Court sought to balance the state's
interest which the statute was designed to protect, against the probative
value of the excluded evidence.0 6 In State v. Gardner, °7 the Ohio
Supreme Court described the state's interest as protecting the victim
from undue harassment. 8 In addition, the statute was intended to aid
the Court in the truth finding process by excluding evidence that is
unduly inflammatory.' °9 In Gardner, the defendant sought to introduce
evidence that the victim, a prostitute, routinely solicited sex from third
parties."' The Court ruled that the state's interest in excluding evidence
that the victim was a prostitute outweighed what little, if any, probative
value it may have had."'
In State v. Ferguson, " 2 the defendant sought to introduce
evidence that the victim had intercourse two days prior to the alleged
incident, where the victim claimed it was at least ten days earlier.'13 The
Court ruled this evidence was inadmissible because the only relevant
fact was whether the defendant and victim had prior sexual relations, not
when victim had her last sexual encounter. The evidence would have
been relevant in order to prove the defendant was not the source of the
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appeals court which held the evidence was
inadmissible. Id. The Court distinguished this case from others because the defendant
offered the evidence after the victim testified she was a lesbian and the evidence would
impeach her statements and go directly to the matter at issue, namely consent. Id.
105 Id.
]06 Id.
107 391 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio 1979).
- Id. at 340.
109 Id.
l01d. at 340-41.
.. Id. at 341; see also Roberts v. State, 510 So. 2d 885, 892 (Fla. 1987) (holding
that evidence of prostitution is excluded by Florida's rape shield law). Cf N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 60.42 (b) (McKinney 1997) (allowing evidence of a complainant's arrests for
prostitution).
"2 450 N.E. 2d 265 (Ohio 1983).
",3Id. at 269.
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semen, however, the Court found this was not at issue."4 The Court
found the only reason the defense wanted to introduce this evidence was
to impeach the credibility of the victim." 5
The Maryland Court of Appeals sustained the Maryland rape
shield law in Thomas v. State."6 In Thomas, the defendant, on cross-
examination, wished to inquire whether the alleged victim was a virgin
and whether she used birth control as evidence of his contention that she
consented to the incident in question." 7 He also wanted to introduce
evidence that the alleged victim "liked sex with black men."" 8 The
Court upheld the trial court's decision, finding this inquiry to be
irrelevant because "the victim's prior sexual acts with persons other than
the defendant is not relevant to prove that she consented to intercourse
with the defendant.""' 9 In upholding the statute's constitutionality, the
Court stated that "a defendant has no constitutional right to present
irrelevant evidence" and that "where the probative value of the evidence
is outweighed by the State's interest," there is no violation of the
defendant's rights. 2 '
Another example where a defendant was denied his right to
cross-examine was in People v. Sandoval.'' In Sandoval, the defendant
was on trial for the sexual assault of his former girlfriend.'22 Defense
counsel wished to show that the victim had anal sex with other men in
the past in order to show she would have consented to anal sex with the
defendant.'23 The trial court did not allow this testimony, the Illinois
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 483 A.2d 6 (Md. 1984).
"' Id. at 17-18.
.. Id. at 18.
"'
9 Id. The defendant in this case was also on trial for double murder and the rape
shield law was only one of many appeals before the court. Id. at 10.
120 Id. at 18-19.
121 552 N.E.2d 726 (I1. 1991).
112 Id. at 727.
123 Id. at 728.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
Appellate Court reversed'24 and the Supreme Court of Illinois reinstated
the guilty verdict stating: "the question before the jury was whether the
defendant forced the complainant to have anal and oral sex against her
will" and that any other matter was collateral and not admissible.'25 The
Court also found that the cross-examination of the defendant was in
violation of the rape shield law but at the time of the questioning the
defendant did not object.'26 If a court allows this practice to continue,
a defendant can avoid application of the statute by not objecting to a
prosecution question and then impeaching the victim.'27 In other words,
if a prosecutor asks a question about a victim's past sexual history which
is prohibitedby a rape shield statute and the defendant does not object,
he is barred from introducing evidence to rebut the answer.
Several cases have found that particular circumstances require
an inquiry into a complainant's past sexual history in order to protect a
defendant's constitutional rights. In Lewis v. State,'28 the Supreme Court
of Florida reversed the conviction of a defendant who was denied the
right to introduce evidence showing the alleged victim's propensity to lie
about the allegations of rape.'29 The defense wished to proffer testimony
showing that the victim, was sexually active with her boyfriend, a fact
which she lied to her mother about, and that the victim was concerned
that her gynecological exam would reveal this fact to her mother.3 ° The
Court held that "exclusion of the proffered cross-examination with such
strong potential to demonstrate the falsity of the alleged victim's
accusations cannot be justified by the public policy furthered by the
124 178 II1. App. 3d 669 (I11. App. Ct. 1989).
2.5 Sandoval, 552 N.E.2d at 742. The other matters the court referred to were
whether the alleged victim had anal sex with other men besides the defendant. Id at 741.
216 Id. at 728.
27 d. at 729 (noting that any prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the
complainant saying she never had anal sex was remedied by the trial court's instruction to
the jury to ignore this testimony).
"2' 591 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1991).
129 Id. at 923.
130 id.
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exclusion." 3'
In Winfield v. Commonwealth,' the defendant proffered
evidence to show the alleged victim had a "pattern of past sexual
conduct involving extortion of money by threats after acts of
prostitution."'3 This evidence was not allowed by the trial court, but the
Supreme Court of Virginia found this evidence was admissible to show
that the victim had a distinct pattern of extortion following sexual
conduct for money.'34 This evidence, though usually not permissible, is
allowed if the behavior shows a pattern directly relating to the conduct
of the victim as alleged by the defendant.' Under the motive to
fabricate provision, the trial court must ascertain whether the evidence
goes toward proving the defense's claim or if it is simply an attack on the
character of the victim.'36
When a legislature attempts to create such a rigid statute, as do
states following the Michigan approach, there are bound to be flaws.'37
As the above cases show, there is a need to conduct inquiries on a case-
by-case basis, as courts have been doing, in order to avoid violation of
a defendant's constitutional rights. However, this is explicitly prohibited
in all Michigan-type statutes. 3 Although the statute sets absolute
guidelines, the courts of many states attempt to weaken the statute by
requiring an in camera inspection to determine relevancy.'39 As written,
'3' Id. at 926.
3 301 S.E.2d 15 (Va. 1983).
SId. at 20.
'14 Id. at 21.
11 See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7(3)(B) (Michie 1996) (stating that "[n]othing
contained in this section shall prohibit the accused from presenting evidence relevant to
show the complaining witness had a motive to fabricate the charge against the accused").
'
36 See Winfiel4 301 S.E.2d at 21. But see id. (stating that the motive to fabricate
provision should be narrowly construed and used in only limited circumstances)(Thompson,
J., dissenting).
'"Galvin, supra note 17, at 872.
38 See, e.g., MICH. COmp. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 1991).
'
3 9 See People v. Hackett, 365 N.W.2d 120 (Mich. 1975) (allowing an in camera
inspection).
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the Michigan model statute does not work because courts continuously
abuse their power by allowing in camera hearings to see if evidence can
be admitted, where the legislature has already decided that such
evidence is not admissible. 4 ' This is what the Michigan approach
sought to remove. The legislative intent was to remove any arbitrary or
biased rulings by the judiciary.' 4'
C. Challenges to the New Jersey Approach
Where the Michigan approach is extremely limited, if not
theoretically absolute with regard to judicial discretion, states following
the New Jersey approach give judges absolute discretion in determining
the admissibilityof a victim's past sexual conduct.'42 The sole factor in
determining relevance is whether the prejudicial effect outweighs the
probative value.143 The only protection afforded the victim is an in
camera inspection to protect public disclosure of irrelevant prejudicial
evidence."'
In Allen v. State,'45 the Texas Court of Criminal. Appeals
determined the facial constitutionality of the Texas rape shield statute,
as well as the statute's constitutionality as applied to the facts of the
Allen.'46 The defendant wished to introduce evidence that the victim
4
'See Galvin, supra note 17, at 874 (discussing a case where court permitted an
in camera hearing).
"' It is up to the courts to decide if a statute is to be held unconstitutional,
however, it is beyond the court's power to give themselves discretion where they do not have
any. See generally Galvin, supra note 17.
142 Galvin, supra note 17, at 876 (stating that the Texas approach gives
"untrammeled judicial discretion" to the judge).
41 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.1 (West 1994).
'44 Galvin, supra note 17, at 877.
14' 700 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). This case was decided under the
former Texas rape shield law which gave thejudiciary full discretion, thus it is placed in this
section of the Note.
146 id. at 932.
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was not a virgin, through evidence of her past sexual conduct, and that
her testimony that she was a virgin left a false impression with the
jury. 4 7 The Court held the trial judge properly excluded the evidence.
The Court found the Texas statute has two parts, the first being that the
evidence must be relevant, and second, the evidence cannot be
inflammatory or prejudicial.'48 The Court stated "whether she was or
was not a virgin was not material to an issue in the case. Even if [it] was
relevant.., its inflammatory or prejudicial nature certainly outweighed
its probative value."'
149
The decision in Allen clearly shows that in jurisdictions
following this approach, full discretion is given to the judge and the
balancing test used is no differentthan the standard rules of evidence.' 50
Clearly, if the purposes of rape shield laws are to be achieved, there
should be a more structured statute which reduces the discretion of the
trial court.' 5' A statute such as this allows far too much opportunity for
judicial bias against both the victim and the defendant.'
Opinions interpreting this type of statute further illustrate that
legislation has failed to provide the necessary guidelines to courts
regarding what evidence should be relevant. State v. Sheard1'
exemplifies the difficulties surrounding these statutes. In Sheard, ten
defendants were charged jointly with the rape of a fifteen-year-old
147 Id. at 926-27.
141 Id. at 924; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.065 (1985) (noting that the
former Texas rape shield law was repealed on September 1, 1986).
14' Allen, 700 S.W.2d at 930.
150 See FED. R. EVID. 401-03. The only difference between the rape shield laws
following the New Jersey model and these basic rules of evidence is that the rape shield law
presumes evidence of past sexual conduct is irrelevant; State v. Parker, 730 P.2d 921, 926
(Idaho 1986) (Bakes, J., dissenting in part) (referring to the hearing the court holds outside
the presence of the jury as "clearly a relevancy hearing").
... Galvin, supra note 17, at 883 (stating that an individual judge, not particularly
sympatheticto a rape victim, could easily admit potentially humiliating evidence, in addition
to the fact that the prosecution cannot appeal the judges ruling, makes this danger very real).
1
52 Id.
5 870 S.W.2d 212 (Ark. 1994).
508 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIII
girl.'54 Several of the defendants sought to introduce evidence of sexual
activities between the victim, Sheard and threeof the other defendants
which occurred several months before the alleged rape.'55 , These
defendants testified at an in camera evidentiary hearingthat the victim
had a continuous and ongoing sexual relationship with Sheard, her
boyfriend, and several others, including some of the other defendants.' 56
The trial court ruled that all of the evidence to which the defendants
testified would be admissible at trial.
57
On an interlocutory appeal brought by the State, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas reversed the trial court's decision, stating that they
"fail to see how [the victim's] prior sexual conduct, as related by the
three defendants ... bears on or relates to whether she consented to a
group sex situation.... '"" The Court further held that a victim's prior
sexual relations with a single defendant was not relevant to a situation
of alleged gang rape.'59
The Arkansas rape shield statute grants trial courts great latitude
in weighing proffered testimony and making determinations as to
1 Id. at 213 (stating that the charges were subsequently dismissed against two of
the defendants).
"' Id. at 213.
156 Sheard, 870 S.W.2d at 213. Specifically, defendant Sheard testified that the
other defendants were present in the house at one time or another while he was having
consensual sex with the victim. Id. Sheard further testified that, on one occasion, the victim
had sex with himself and defendant Turner on the same day. Id. Defendant Robinson
testified that he and some of the other defendants looked under the door and saw defendant
Sheard having consensual sex with the victim. Id. He also testified that he had seen the
victim having consensual sex with defendantTurner. Id. Defendant Bryant testified that he
also looked under the door while defendant Sheard and the victim were having consensual
sex and that he never had sex with the victim before the date of the alleged rape. Id.
' ' Sheard, 870 S.W.2d at 213.
Is d. at 214 (stating that all of the past incidents were in private and even when
the victim had sex with two of the defendantson the same day, each episode was in private).
159 Id.
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admissibility at trial. 6 ' The ruling of the trial court should not be
reversed absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion in
deeming the testimony admissible.' 6 ' An appellate dissent noted that
there was no showing that the trial court abused its discretion or did not
properly weigh the probative value of the testimony against its
prejudicial effect. 62 Under the statute, the dissent argued, the trial court
was correct in finding that the probative value outweighed its prejudicial
effect."'63 If the legislature desires the trial courts do more, it must draft
a statute which explicitly states what is relevant and admissible at
trial.164 The court in this case focused on whether the past sexual
conduct between the victim and the defendants was admissible. Even
under the rigid Michigan approach, this type of evidence is always
relevant and admissible if the probative value outweighs the prejudicial
effect.'65 Theoretically,the New Jersey approach should provide greater
protection for the defendant and less for the victim than the Michigan
approach, but the unintended reality is that the reverse can occur, which
is illustrated by the Sheard case.
State v. Parker'66 is another case where an appellate court
reversed the finding of a trial court.'67 In Parker, the defendant sought
to introduce evidence of the fourteen-year-old victim's pregnancy at the
time of the alleged rape in order to establish a motive for her to fabricate
I ld. at 216 (Newburn, J., dissenting); see also ARK. CODE ANN. §16-42-101
(Michie 1993); Marion v. Arkansas, 590 S.W.2d 288 (Ark. 1979) (summarizing the
Arkansas rape shield law).
161 Sheard, 870 S.W.2d at 216 (Newburn, J., dissenting).
161 Id. (stating that "[tihere is no clear right or wrong in such a decision").
1
63 See id. (stating that although the alleged incidents are "abhorrent... it must be
remembered that at this point they are only allegations").
'"See id. at 217 (supporting the legislature's purpose for the rape shield law and
stating that under the statute, the decision of a trial judge should not be disturbed unless it
is clearly erroneous and the "threshold is high").
65 See supra Part III.A.
'"730 P.2d 921 (Idaho 1986).
167 Id. at 924.
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the rape.'68 The trial court did not allow this evidence because it gave
rise to an inference about the victim's past sexual conduct. The Supreme
Court of Idaho reversed stating that "where the defense is consent,
evidence of prior unchastity may be relevant and material."'69
Regardless of whether one agrees with the Court's holding, if a
legislature enacts a New Jersey-type statute, a trial court's determination
as to the admissibility of past sexual conduct should not be reversed
unless the objecting party shows that the trial court's decision evinces an
abuse of its discretion.7 In Parker, there was no showing that the trial
court abused its discretion. The Court merely relied on its belief that
where consent is in issue, evidence of a victim's past sexual conduct is
admissible because her credibility is in issue."'
Both the Sheard and Parker cases illustrate the problems
inherent in the New Jersey-type statutes.'72 In both cases the appellate
courts reversed their respective lower courts without first finding that
their decisions were predicated on an abuse of discretion.'73 These
rulings show that in states following the New Jersey approach, it is
necessary for the legislature to reform their rape shield statutes to
provide trial courts with the guidance they need. Failure on the part of
a legislature to reform the rape shield laws will perpetuate the arbitrary
rulings of the trial courts and the unfounded reversals by their respective
appellate courts.
D. Challenges to the Federal Approach
The Federal approach combines the rigid Michigan model with
168 Id.
169 Id. at 925.
70 See id. at 926 (Bakes, J., dissenting).
'71 Parker, 730 P.2d at 925.
172 For a full discussion of the New Jersey approach see supra Part III.B.
173 Id.
510 [Vol. XlII
1997] RAPE SHIELD LA WS 511
the amorphous New Jersey model.'74 There is a "catch-all" provision
included in Federal approach statutes that provides the trial court with
discretion to allow evidence that is not excepted explicitly by the
statute. 75
In State v. Christiano, 176 the defendant was convicted of sexual
assault and appealed on the grounds that his Sixth Amendment rights
were violated when he was not allowed to introduce evidence of the
victim's past sexual conduct, which he claimed was critical to his
defense of consent. 77 The Connecticut Supreme Court found that the
rape shield law was enacted to prohibit exactly what the defendant
wished to introduce. 78 The Court further stated that evidence of such a
prejudicial nature is not admissible and it does not violate the
Constitution to prohibit it.' 79
In State v. Alvey, 8 ° the defendant wished to introduce evidence
that the victim had falsely claimed she was raped in the past.'' The trial
court did not admit the evidence and the Iowa Supreme Court found that
they did not abuse their discretion.'82
... For a full discussion of the Federal approach see supra Part III.C.
' This is essentially what the courts following the Michigan approach have done,
though they are supposedly prohibited from doing so. See supra Part III.B.
176 637 A.2d 382 (Conn. 1994).
17 Id. at 387. Specifically, the defendant wished to introduce that the victim, his
foster child, consented to sexual relations with her foster brothers, sexual abuse by her
natural brothers, and various sexual encounters at the workplace. Id. at 387-88.
... Id. at 388-89.
"9 Id. at 389 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)) (holding that
"the determination of whether the state's interest in excluding evidence must yield to those
interests of the defendant is determined by the facts and circumstances of the particular
case"). In addition, the Court stated that the defendant did not raise the defense of consent
by explicitly denying having sex with the alleged victim. Christiano, 637 A.2d at 388.
18o 458 N.W. 2d 850 (Iowa 1990).
Id. at 852.
IS? Id. at 852-53 (stating their reasoning was due in part to their doubt of the
truthfulness of the proffered evidence. The Court stated that ordinary truthfulness of
evidence is a matter for the fact-finderbut claimed the quality of evidence in light of the rape
shield statute is relevant to keeping the focus off the victim.).
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"The Alvey Court exploited the rights of the defendant... by
categorizing evidence of a prior false rape accusation as irrelevant."' I3
The evidence of a false rape charge should be admitted because it
directly relates to the complainant's credibility and does.not bring out
nor focus on her unchaste conduct. 4 The Alvey case exemplifies the
danger in leaving discretion, without sufficient guidance, to the trial
judge. '5 Without guidance the results will be inconsistent and the
defendant will be victimized when he is not permitted to introduce
potentially relevant evidence which the jury should weigh in their
evaluation.
Although the Federal approach employs both the Michigan and
New Jersey models, it also adopted the problems inherent in each.'86
The "catch-all" provision gives no guidelines at all, essentially making
the statute like the New Jersey model.'87 In addition, the absolute
prohibition on reputation testimony, as in the Michigan model, may
deprive the finder of fact from hearing relevant evidence. 88
E. Challenges to the California Approach
The California approach is unique in that it separates sexual
conduct evidence into two parts. 8 9 Evidence offered to prove consent
is inadmissible unless the evidence is of prior sexual conduct between
the victim and the defendant. 9  Evidence offered to attack the
3 Fisher, supra note 9, at 836.
114 Id. at 846.
'
85 See generally Fisher, supra note 9 (discussing the problems inherent in Iowa's
rape shield law which follows the Federal approach).
116 Galvin, supra note 17, at 893 (stating that although the legislature included a
"catch-all" provision in the law, they gave no guidance as to when a court should rely on it).
187 Id.
18 Id.
'8' For a full discussion of the California approach see supra Part III.D.
19o See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103 (b) (West 1995).
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credibility of the victim is subject to an in camera inspection and is
admissible within the discretion of the trial court. 9'
In Johnson v. State,92 the twelve-year-old victim claimed that
the defendant entered her home, grabbed her, placed his hand on her
vagina, and eventually strangled her until she passed out. 93 The
defendant contended that he should have been allowed to ask the victim
whether she ever had sex to prove that the seminal fluid found in her was
not from him.'94 The Delaware Supreme Court said that this question
was too open-ended and all it would have shown was that the victim had
sex at an unknown time and not whether it was in the proximity of the
attack.' 95 The Court further stated that the admissibility of evidence is
solely within the discretion of the trial judge.' 96
The confusion surrounding the California approach is clear in
People v. Varona.'97 . In Varona, the defendant raised the defense of
consent claiming the encounter was in exchange for money.' 9 He
sought to introduce evidence that the alleged victim had prior
convictions for prostitution.' 99 The trial court did not admit this
evidence and the California Court of Appeals reversed the decision
stating it was relevant to the victim's credibility.200
The California Court of Appeals was wrong in admitting the
evidence of prostitution. It was not admitted to prove that prostitutes
have a lack of credibility, but rather to prove consent. 20' To admit the
19] Id.
192 550 A.2d 903 (Del. 1988).
- Id. at 905.
'94 Id. at 906.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 906-07 (stating that this evidence only would have misled the jury and
created confusion).
197 143 Cal. App.3d 566 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
198 Id.
'
99 Id. at 569.
2
11 See also People v. Randle, 181 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1982) (allowing the defendant
to admit evidence of the victim's prostitution).
21 See Galvin, supra note 17, at 898.
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evidence for this purpose is prohibited by California-type rape shield
statutes.202
The above cases show the fine line between evidence proving
consent and evidence impeaching credibility. This is the flaw in the
California approach. The ambiguity and discretion given to the trial
judge, without specific guidelines, is unfair and risks violating a
defendant's constitutional rights, as well as undermining the legislative
intent of the statute-protecting the victim." 3
V. The Issue of Consent and Abuse of Judicial Discretion
Proving lack of consent in rape cases has always been
problematic. 24  In "date rape" situations, where the victim and the
defendant know each other, court rulings on the admissibility of
evidence show the dangers of a lack of legislative guidance as to what
evidence can be admitted? °5 Most courts allow evidence of prior sexual
encounters between the defendant and the victim, however this evidence
may not be relevant in all cases, especially if the last encounter was not
close in time to the alleged incident? 6 In addition, where the victim and
defendant are acquaintances but never had any sexual relationship,
evidence of a victim's sexual history may be relevant under certain
factual situations. As a result, rulings in this area of law appear
arbitrary.
One case that exemplifies the fact that rape shield laws do not
adequately protect the victim is Commonwealth v. Berkowitz. °7 In
202 Id. at 899.
203 Id. at 894 (discussing the problems inherent in the California model and other
states following that approach).
204 See generally Barbara Fromm, Sexual Battery: Mixed Signal Legislation
Reveals the Need for Further Reform, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 579 (1991).
20  Id. at 601 n.161.
206 Id.
207 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
514 [Vol. XIII
1997] RAPE SHIELD LA WS 515
Berkowitz, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the defendant
should have been allowed to introduce evidence in support of his theory
that the prior sexual history of the victim may have influenced her
decision to fabricate rape charges." 8 In Berkowitz, the victim went to
visit her boyfriend who was not at home, and having nothing to do, went
to the room of the defendant, whom the victim knew." 9 According to
the victim, the defendant asked for a backrub and the victim declined
saying she did not trust him. 1 ° After talking for a while longer, the
defendant sat next to the victim and "kind of pushed her back with his
body." '' The victim stated she had to leave at which point the
defendant lifted her bra and began fondling her.212 The victim again said
"no. '213 The victim did not physically resist so the defendant unzipped
his pants and attempted to place his penis in her mouth, at which point
the victim again said she had to leave.2"4 The defendant placed the
victim on the bed in a way described by the victim as being somewhere
between romantic and forceful, he removed her pants, and eventually
had sex with her until he ejaculated. 215 He then stated that they got
carried away to which the victim responded that "he-" got carried
away. 2 6 The victim left and told her boyfriend that she had been
raped.217
The defendant wished to introduce evidence that the victim was
having problems with her boyfriend? 8 The defendant alleged that these
201 Id. at 1340-41.
2 9Id. at 1339.
210 Id. at 1340.
211 Id.
212 Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1340.
213 id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
237 Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1340.
21 Id. at 1349.
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problems were due to the victim's continuous infidelities. 19 The
defendant contended that evidence of these infidelities should be
admissible because the victim may have fabricated the rape to avoid
further arguments with her boyfriend.22 °  . .,
The Court held that the Pennsylvania rape shield law221.cannot
preclude evidence supporting the defense claim of consent.222 In
holding that the evidence was relevant, the Court found the proffered
evidence was the only way to show the accusations were fabricated and
necessary to protect the defendant's rights.2 3
In so holding, the Court.clearly overstepped its discretion and
disregarded the legislative intent of the statute.2 4 The Pennsylvania
statute and others like it leave no room for judicial discretion.225 The
issue here is not whether the proffered evidence is relevant. The
Pennsylvania legislature specifically said it was not relevant through the
structure of their rape shield statute. If a court is going to use its
219 Id.
220/Id.
221 See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104 (West 1983). This sfatute can be
categorized as a Michigan-type statute. See generally Galvin, supra note 17.
222 Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1352.
223 Id. at 1351. The Court further stated that the defendant should not be allowed
unlimited questioning and any prejudicial effect of the questioning will be reduced by a
limiting instruction by the judge. Id. at 1352. But see Cheryl Siskin, No. The "Resistance
Not Required" Statute and "Rape Shield Law" May Not Be Enough-Commonwealth v.
Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 531, 533 (1992) (stating that the Court
misapplied the law by allowing the focus to shift from the defendant's forceful conduct to
the victim's reputation for consensual intercourse which is clearly in opposition to the
legislative intent of enacting the law).
224 Siskin, supra note 223, at 548-49 (stating that the Court's application of the rape
shield law has setback the progress made by it's general prohibition of evidence).
225 See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 3104 '(West 1983) (allowing evidence of a
victim's past sexual history only if it isbetween the defendant and the victim and is offered
for the issue of consent).
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discretion regardless of the statute,226 the legislature should respond with
rape shield legislation that Will set explicit guidelines so as to better
protect victims from unnecessary harassment, as was originally
intended, as well as eliminate the risk of violating a defendant's
constitutional rights.2
27
VI. The Supreme Court's Failure to Respond
Although the.U.S.'Supreme Court has twice touched on issues
concerning rape shield statutes,22 it has never ruled on the facial validity
of these statutes. 29 In the first case, Olden v. Kentucky,230 the Court
addressed a lower court's prejudice due to the biracial nature of the
evidence involved-the sexual nature of the evidence was only
secondary" In the other case, Michigan v. Lucas,232 the Court ruled on
the procedural aspects of Michigan's rape shield law, not the substance
of the law.233 Due to the inherent constitutional issue surrounding rape
shield laws, it is time for the Supreme Court to rule on their validity and
226 See Galvin, supra note 17, at 873 (stating that appellate courts in over half the
states following the Michigan approach have allowed defendants to admit evidence of
conduct explicitly prohibited by their respective statutes).
2 7 See generally id. at 903-05 (recommending a statute that will cure the defects
inherent in rape shield laws); see also Fisher, supra note 9, at 869-70.
221 See supra Part IV.A.
29, Lisa M. Dillman, Stephens v. Miller: Restoration of the Defendant's Sixth
Amendment Rights, 28 IND. L. REV. 97, 103 (1994) (discussing the issues before the Court
in Michigan v. Lucas); see also Fishman, supra note 2, at 753 (discussing the Court's
holding in Olden v. Kentucky).
230 488 U.S. 227 (1988),
23 Fishman,supra note 2, at 753 (stating that Olden was not a rape shield case per
se, but the Court's holding would have been the same if it had been decided on rape shield
grounds).
232 500 U.S. 145 (1991).
233 Dillman,supra note 229, at 103 (stating that the issue in Lucas was the notice
and hearing requirement embodied in the statute and the Court did not have to address the
.intricate constitutional aspects of Michigan's statute).
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guide legislatures on what evidence cannot be constitutionally excluded
and assist lower courts by establishing a balancing test to use in
weighing the relevance of a complainant's past sexual conduct with her
right to privacy.
The Supreme Court had this opportunity in Stephens v. Miller.234
The controversial issues present in Stephens were apparent from the
Seventh Circuit's en banc 6-5 plurality opinion.235 In Stephens, the
Seventh Circuit issued seven different opinions,23 6 each presenting a
different opinion of the law and the appropriate balancing test.237
The facts of Stevens are as follows: after an evening of drinking,
the defendant, Lonnie Stephens, went to the trailer home of an
acquaintance, Melissa Wilburn?38 The complainanttestified at trial that
she awoke to find Stephens standing in her doorway and that he sat
down next to her and tried to kiss her.239 She claimed that she called out
to her sister and brother-in-law who were asleep in the next room.24 °
Wilburn testified that Stephens then unfastened her bra, ripped a button
from her shirt, and opened his pants.24' At this point, Wilburn allegedly
pushed the defendant off and ran to her sister's room.242 The defendant
left and went to the home of a friend and told him that he had been at a
local store.243
Stephens testified to quite a different scenario at trial. He stated
that Wilburn invited him in and "one thing led to another" and they had
234 13 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 57 (1994).
23 John Lausch, Stephens v. Miller: The Need to Shield Rape Victims, Defend
Accused Offenders, andDefine a Workable ConstitutionalStandara4 90 NW. U. L. REv. 346,
348 (1995) (stating that "the constitutionality of applying a rape shield statute is a difficult,
gut-wrenching, and controversial issue").
236 See Stephens, 13 F.3d at 998.
237 Id.
231 Id. at 1000.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1000.
242 Id.
243 Id. (noting that Stephens later repeated this same story to the police).
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consensual sex.244 The defendant was only allowed to testify that he
then said "something" to the complainant that angered her and caused
her to ask him to stop and leave her home.245 The trial court found that
Indiana's rape shield statute246 prohibited the defendant from introducing
the content of those remarks. In an offer of proof, Stephens stated that
he and Wilburn were "doing it doggy fashion" and he said to the
complainant "don't you like it like this? ... Tim Hall said you did. 247
The lower court did not allow the jury to hear this and the defendantwas
found guilty of attempted rape. 48
In his petition for habeas corpus to the Seventh Circuit, the
defendant raised three issues.249 The Court only discussed one of the
issues and summarily dismissed the other two.2 50 The Court did not
review the facial validity of the rape shield law which had been upheld
in a past decision.' However, the Court stated that the statute's
constitutionalityas applied remains subject to a case-by-case analysis.252
The plurality opinion found that although the defendant had a
constitutional right to testify, that right is not unlimited.253 Moreover,
the Court held that the restrictions imposed by the rape shield law cannot
be arbitrary and disproportionate 54 They concluded that the trial court
2 44 Id.
245 Id. at 1001.
246 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (West 1994). This statute follows the Michigan
approach.
2417 Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1000.
241 Id. at 1000-01.
249 Lausch, supra note 235, at 351.
250 Id. at 352 (stating that Stephen's claim that the Court did not properly apply
Indiana law and his claim that the evidence was part of the res gestae of the crime were
summarily dismissed on the grounds that a federal habeas corpus petition does not allow for
review of the applicationof state law. That decision is left for the state appellate courts, and
the res gestae claim was rejected on the grounds that it had no place in federal law).
251 See Moore v. Duckworth, 687 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1982).
252 Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1001.
253 Id. at 1002.
254 Id.; see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987).
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correctly weighed the evidence and properly excluded Stephen's vulgar
statements.255
The Court believed that allowing the defendant to testify that he
said "something" to upset the complainant satisfied any constitutional
requirements. 256 They stated that the jury heard both stories and could
believe whichever story they chose.257 However, one commentator
pointed out that this would ordinarily be true, but due to the rape shield
statute, the defendant was not permitted to give his full side of the
story. 25' For the defendant to win he must introduce evidence that
overcomes the victim's advantage, in addition to introducing evidence
that would tip the scale in his favor.259  1 1 1
In his dissent, Justice Cummings stated that the rape shield
statute is a valid determination that rape victims needto be protected but
this must yield to another vital interest: the accused's rightto present
evidence in his favor.260 The purpose of rape shield legislation was not
to put one party ahead of another, however many courts appear to be
interpreting the statutes as putting the victim before the. defendant.26'
The Supreme Court decided to leave the issues -raised in
Stephens and other rape shield cases unresolved.262., Eventually, the
Court will have to address the questions raised in the Stephens dissents,
as well as other controversial rape shield cases. Once again the lack of
guidance surrounding rape shield laws and the abuse of judicial
discretion has infringed on a defendant's constitutional rights and it is
255 Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1002-03; see Lausch, supra note 235, at 355. "The
plurality also hinted that Stephens' story was unbelievable." Id. "The Court found it
significant that Stephens directed David Stone, the friend.., to commit perjury." Id.256 Id. at 1002.
257 Id. at 1003.
258 See Dillman, supra note 229, at 109 (stating that the defendant and the
complainant were not starting on equal ground while telling their respective stories).
259 Id. (arguing that this initial inequality renders the statute unconstitutional).
26
°.Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1010 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
21 See Dillman, supra note 229, at 110 (stating that the reason rape victims are put
ahead of defendants is to make up for the suffering the victims endured in the past).
262 Stephens v. Miller, 115 S.Ct. 57 (1994).
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time for the Supreme Court to resolve these issues when they are again
presented with the opportunity.263
VII. Conclusion
Rape shield laws are necessary to protect a victim of a sex crime
from being victimized in court. However, this in no way means that a
defendant, who sits in the courtroom, presumed innocent, should have
his constitutional rights diminished. The structure of the current rape
shield allows violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. The lack
of guidance from the' legislature leaves the courts guessing at what
evidence is admissible, which in turn leads to arbitrary decisions. In
order to prevent such injustices, it is time for the Supreme Court to
resolve the conflicting issues inherent in rape shield statutes and for the
legislature to follow by amending the statutes of their jurisdictions in
accordance with such rulings. Until the Supreme Court acts, state
legislatures will be afforded too much power over a defendant's rights,
the judiciary will not have the needed guidance from the legislature, and
defendants will continue to have their rights violated.
Shawn J. Wallach
263 See Lausch, supra note 235, at 386 (suggesting an alternative balancing test
which would give trial courts further guidance to protect a defendant's constitutional
guarantees while still enforcing rape shield laws which "must be retained"); see also
Dillman, supra note 229, at 110-13 (outlining the arguments the Supreme Court will have
to resolve concerning rape shield statutes).
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